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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue in this case is whether the operation of the Camp
Williams Army National
immune

from

liability

Guard NCO Club Bar was intended
for causes of action

arising

to be

under

the

Utah Dram Shop Act at U.C.A. 32-11-1 by either U.C.A. 32-11-2 or
U.C.A. 63-30-10(l)(i) .
STATUTES TO BE REVIEWED
The Judicial

interpretation

of

the Legislative

intent of

the following statutes is determinative of this case.
U.C.A. 32-11
Section 1:
(1) anv person who givesr sells or otherwise provides intoxicating

liquor to another

contrary

to section

16-6-13.1(8)

(d), section 32-1-36.5(1)(1) , section 32-7-14 or section 32-7-24
(b) or

(c) , and thereby causes the intoxication of the other

person, is liable for injuries in oerson, property, or means of
suoport to any third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of
that third person, resulting from the intoxication.
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to in subsection (1) of this section, shall have a cause of action against
the intoxicated person and the person who provided the intoxicating liquor in violation of subsection (1) above, or either of
them.
(3) If a person

having

rights or liabilities under

this

section dies, the rights or liabilities provided by this section
shall survive to or against that persons estate.
Section 2:

No nrovision of this act shall create any civil liability
on the part of the State, its agencies, employees, or political
subdivisions,
controlling,

arising

out

their

activities

authorizing, or otherwise being

in

regulating,

involved

in, the

sale or other distrubution of intoxicating liquor.
U.C.A. 53-30
Subsection 10(1) :
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for iniuries oroximately caused by a negligent act or ommission
by an employee committed within the scope of his employment
except if the injury:
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National
Guard ?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
survivors

case

is

a wrongful

of Jacquelyn

by

the

Brinkerhoff. Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff

was

killed by a hit and run driver.
who had

a blood

Brinkerhoff

was

alcohol
killed

death

action

brought

The driver was Alexander Aerts

content
within

of

six

.19 percent.
minutes

after

Jacquelyn
Defendant

Alexander Aerts left the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO
Club.

Alexander Aerts was the guest of Conrad Christensen, who,

at that time, was a member of the Camp Williams Army National
Guard NCO Club.

Alexander Aerts hit Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff from

behind while she was bicycle riding safely out of the lane of
traffic.

She did not contribute to her demise.

B r i n k e r h o f f s bicycle

locked

onto

Jacquelyn

the front bumper of

the

vehicle Aerts was driving and he pushed it for another five (5)
-2-

miles before it fell off and one mile later was stopped by the
oolice for the hit and run.

Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff left behind

six

in ages from six months to nine

small children ranging

years.

Alexander Aerts and the owner of the vehicle, which was

Conrad

Christensen1 s father, having already settled out, the

only remaining Defendant is Allen Forsyth, a National Guard
mechanic

who moonlights as a bar tender at the Camp Williams

Army National Guard NCO Club.
Summary Judgment was grantel against

D

laintiffs by Judge

Murohy of the Third District Court who ruled that the exemption
from liability in section 2 of the Dram Shop Act shielded Allen
Forsyth and the State of Utah from liability.

further, Judge

Murphy ruled, "the basis for ruling is the immunity granted in
U.C.A. section 63-30-10(1)(i) and 32-1-2".

The statutory his-

tory concerning the latter section is not justification for
limiting immunity to the "wholesale" sale of liquor.

As Plain-

tiff indicated, the statements of Senator Jeffs were made in the
"frenzy" of the last day of legislative business. This appeal
ensued, and the matter appears to be a case of first impression.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The governmental immunity section of the Dram Shop Act and
the immunity for the National Guard were not intended to cover
this

situation of

the National Guard's operation of the Camp

Williams Army National Guard NCO Club.
ARGUMENTS
U.C.A. SECTION 32-11-2 WAS NOT INTENDED TO EXTEND IMMUNITY TO THE
PRESENT SITUATION.
When Courts apply statutory law, they are bound to consider
-3-

legislative intent so as to make the legislation meaningful and
avoid absurd results,
American Coal Co, vs. Sundstrom 689 P. 2d 1,3 (Utah 1984); Murray
City vs. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983); Andrus vs, Allred
404 P.2d

972, 974 (Utah 1965); State vs. Jones 735 P.2d

402 (Utah App. 1987); State vs. Day 638 P.2d
Holy

399 at

546 (Wash. 1981);

Trinity Church vs. United States, 143 U.S. 4 57, 12 S.Ct.

511, 36 L. ed. 226; Markham vs. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 at 409, 66
S.Ct. 193 at 195; Utah International, Inc. vs . Department of Interior 6 43 F. Supp. 810 at 821 (D. Utah 1986); Millet vs. Clark
Clinic Corp. 509 P.2d 934, 936.
To determine legislative intent, the Court can consider the
historical setting of the statute, the circumstances surrounding
its

oromulgation

and the purpose of the statute.

Saffels vs.

Bennet 630 P.2d 505, 510 (Wvo. 1981); Dependants of Fred Crawford
vs. financial Plaza 643 P.2d 43, 53 (Ha. 198 2 ) ; Parker vs. Rampton 497 P.2d

848, 850

(Utah 1972); State vs. 1 Porsche 2 Door

I.D.#911211026, Title #PP 10026F,etc. 526 P.2d 917 (Utah 1974).
*f U«C.A Section 32-11-2 were to be applied according to its
precise literalness then absurd results could ensue.

The unqua-

lified exemption for State employees would create exemption from
Dram Shop liability as an employee benefit of employment by the
State.

A social host could avoid Dram Shop Liability solely on

the basis of his employment by the State while his private industry neighbor would be found liable for the exact same activity.

This result would be totally absurd, but it would follow

from a precise reading of the statute.
-4-

Further, the statute de-

prives the citizen's of Utah from the social responsibility the
State as such has a duty to it's citizens.

It is apparent from

the face of U.C.A. Section 32-11-2 that the exemption is intended
to be for the benefit of the State in fulfilling

its duties in

regulating the use of alcoholic beverages in the State.

The

State of Utah heavily regulates the distribution and sale of alcohol.
at

Every ounce of intoxicating liquor sold in the State must

some time pass through State hands.

Under the statute the

exemption to the State of Utah and its employees applies to their
"activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing or otherwise
being

involved

ages."

in the sale or distribution of alcoholic bever-

In view

of

the State's most

obvious

connection

to

alcohol, the three important words in the statute are regulating,
controlling and authorizing.

The "or otherwise being involved in

the sale" language is an apparent addition to cover any situation
where the State, as a regulator of alcoholic beverages, may slip
out of the exact definition of regulation, control or authorization.

Had the legislature intended total exemption from liabili-

ty, they could have put a period

after oolitical subdivisions.

The excess wording is a clue to what they had in mind.
The Dram Shop Act was introduced in the State Senate in 1981
as Senate Bill 233.

The enactment of the Dram Shop Act is part

of the current trend toward protecting victims rights.

In cases

where someone suffers injury as a result of a person being intoxicated, the Dram Shop Act increases the number of Defendants that
such a Plaintiff has a cause of action against: Utah State Senate
44th Legislative Session, Day 57, Disk 273, March 9, 1981.
-5-

The

Act also encourages social responsibility on the part of persons
who serve or sell alcohol.
referred to the House.

The Bill was passed by the Senate and

While being considered by the House, the

immunity for the State was amended out of the Bill; Utah House o F
Representatives 44th Legislative Session, Day 60, Disks 3 and 4 ,
March 12, 1981 .

When the Bill, as amended, was returned to the

Senate, Senator Jeffs, the sponsor, said the following about the
amendment.
"The amendment to the Bill amended out the
exemption for the State of Utah. There has
been concern expressed by the Attorney General's
office to me that if we exempt out, if we leave
out the exemption for the State of Utah, since
the State is in the wholesale liquor business, we
run the risk of creating some large numbers of law
suits no matter who sells the liquor, and they have
asked me to request that we not accept the amendment by the House and that we recede from it." (Utah
State Senate 44th Legislative Session, Day 60, Disk
309, March 12, 1981. )
The Amendment was refused by the Senate, the House relented
and the Bill passed on the representation that the intent of
U.C.A. section 32-11-2 was to protect the State while engaged in
the wholesale liquor business.

This all happened on the last day

of the session when the legislature was in a frenzy to get done
with its business.

If the wording were to have been changed to

reflect the intent to protect the State and it's employees only
as

liquor wholesalers, the bill would

not have made

it and

another year would go by without the added remedies for victim's
of drunk drivers.
The Dram Shop Act was intended to create a cause of action
in the exact situation we have in this case.
-6-

Plaintiff's dece-

dent

was k i l l e d

served
of

liquor

Defendant

r o l e of

after
Allen

the S t a t e

contained
that

by an e x t r e m e l y

license

for

he was a l r e a d y
Forsyth

had

section

government
government

person

intoxicated.

nothing

in t h e w h o l e s a l e

in U.C.ft

specific

intoxicated

The

is

purpose

and

employees

The

an e x e m p t i o n

to

was
act

not

with

the

immunity

intended

intended

without

been

activities

t o do w h a t e v e r

liquor business.

32-11-2

who had

social

for
as

a

con-

science .
ARGUMENT I I
U.C.A. Section 63-30-10 (l)(i) WAS NOT INTENDED TO EXTEND IMMUNITY TO THE PRESENT SITUATION.
Section 63-30-10 (l)(i) of the Utah Code does not set up the
Utah National Guard as an entity entirely outside the Civil Law
of the State as Defendant would imply.

The Utah National Guard

exists for certain purposes, and the immunity granted to the
Guard only applies to activities inherent to those certain purposes.

The most obvious purposes of the National Guard are their

role as a part of the National Defense and their availability to
assist in times of disaster.

By no stretch of the imagination

does the immunized role of the National Guard extend to operation
of a bar.
mechanic.

Defendant Forsyth's usual work for the Guard is as a
His work as a bartender is supplemtary and outside his

usual duties.

This further illustrates the separation of the NCO

Club from legitimate Guard activities.
To

clothe

the National

Guard

in

immunity

for

whatever

activities the Guard may engage in would be an utter absurdity.
To

avoid

this absurdity and to make the statute meaningful, a

restrictive reading of U.C.A. 63-30-10 (l)(i) is necessary.
-7-

Most

of the cases cited in Argument I are applicable here.
ARGUMENT

111

A TEST FOR GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
To allow total government immunity in this situation is contrary to the guide lines laid down in Standiford vs. Salt Lake
City Corporations, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).

The Court, in the

Standiford case did away with the old analogy of governmental immunity versus a proprietary function because of the conflicting
results case law has established.

The Court rejected the rigid

dichotomy of the past because an activity is not proprietary it
does not necessarily follow that the activity was governmental.
The respondent would have this Court believe that this Court did
not replace any type of analogy for determining governmental immunity.
In

fact, this Court provided

immunity.

a new

test for governmental

In the Standiford case the Court held:
"Tests for determing governmental immunity
is whether activity under consideration is
of such unique nature that it can only be
performed by governmental agency or that it
is essential to the core of governmental
activity."

The

Michigan

Court

has

defined

the

term

"government

function" as those activities invoking the essence of governmentthe "task of governing" - and those activities of such "peculiar"
nature such that [they] can only be done by government." 27 3 N.W.
2d at 416.
Our
Michigan

Court went on to say they were less bound than the
Supreme

Court

in

redefining

"governmental

function".

Unlike the Michigan Immunity Act, the Utah governmental Immunity
-8-

Act does not expressly approve past governmental tort liability,
nor does it even mention, let alone define, "proprietary function."
Michigan is not alone in abandoning the "inherently unsound"
proprietary governmental "quagmire."
In the Standiford case, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
Section 63-30-1 etc:

which became effective July 1, 1966 defines

neither "governmental function" nor "proprietary function."

In-

deed, the Act does not use the term "proprietary function"? it
simply retains tort immunity for some governmental entities, subject to broad statutory exceptions, for injuries resulting from a
"governmental function." Section 63-30-3, as amended by the 1978
Legislature, reads as follows:
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this
act, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility.
It has been stated in scholarly analysis that
the legislature designed the statutory scheme
bo allow the Court flexibility and adaptability
in fashioning consistent and rational limits to
governmenta1 immunity. To that end, the legislature intended the Courts to have the pov/er to
restrict the scopes of governmental immunity."
[Emphasis added.]
When
Immunity

the 1965 Legislature enacted the Utah Governmental
Act,

it

broadened

the

liability

entities....moreover, Legislature authorized
secure liability

of

governmental

public entities to

insurance covering the entity and it's employ-

ees, Section 63-30-28 etc.

The insurance authorization is rele-

vant as to whether a governmental immunity should be subjected to
-9-

liability on tort claims because one historical fear of limiting
immunity has been the unexoected and unplanned for expense to the
public entity.

When the availability of insurance protection,

coupled with the statutory provisions for ceiling on liability,
governmental entities may confidentally and accurately budget for
their potential tour of liability.

The State of Utah is self-

insured until a certain dollar amount is reached, then a private
insurer kicks in to cover the balance up to the statutory amount
allowed by law.
The Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO Club is an entertainment facility provided bv the State of Utah to it's Army
National Guard members and their guests who are not members of
the Army National Guard.
The Air Force National Guard NCO Club is not unlike the Camp
Williams Army National Guard NCO Club.

They both are owned and

operated by the State of Utah as an entertainment facility for
their National Guard members and their guests.

The only dif-

ference is the Air Force National Guard NCO Club is located on
private property and is required to have a State Liquor License
for dispensing alcoholic beverages, where the Camp Williams Army
National Guard NCO Club is not required to have a State Liquor
License because it is located on State property.

Therefore, the

Air Force National Guard NCO Club is regulated by the State
Liquor Agency and the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO Club
is not.
Since
question

the Dram Shop Act

imposed

a strict liability

the

arises, is the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO
-10-

Club immune to any liability because it is located on State property and not required to have a State Liquor License where the
Air Forece NCO Club is on

private property and is required to

have a State Liquor License not immune to liability?
is clearly

The analogy

inconsistent with Respondent's argument of immunitv.

Those regulated by the Liquor Commission and private parties are
subject to the Dram Shop Act.
In the State of Utah vs. Jones NO. 9 6019 9-CA; 5 5 Utah adv.
rep. 60, the Court of Appeals ruled the Courts primary responsibility is construing Legislation is to give effect to the intent
of the Legislature.

And the Court looked at Christensen vs. In-

dustrial Commission, 642 P.2d

755, 756 (Utah 1932).

And the

Court further stated, in addition,
One of the fundamental rules of Statutory
construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in light of the
general purpose it was intended to serve
and should be so interpreted and applied as
to accomplish that objective. In order to
give the statute the implementation which
will fulfill it's purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail over the technically applied literalness.
CONCLUSIONS
The Respondent would^ argue that because the Dram Shop Act
unmi s takabley states that no provisions of the Dram Shop Act
shall create any civil liability on the part of State employees
arising out of their activity in regulating, controlling, authorizing or otherwise being

involved

in, the sale of

liquor, the State and Aerts are immune.
if tested under the Standiford

intoxicating

However, the Act itself,

case, does speak to governmental
-11-

functions.

The Legislative history of the Dram Shop Act makes it

clear

the governmental

that

package

store owners.

And

immunity

protection

was meant

for

the Legislature being aware of the

Standiford case did not specifically narrow the scope of 32-11-2
by providing that exemption from Dram Shop liability
where
Even

State

employees

are exercising

a governmental

applies
function.

though the term "governmental function" is a term of artf

the new interpretation is more strict than the old governmental
vs. proprietarial function.
It is apparent from the face of U.C.A. Section 32-11-2 that
the exemption is intended to be for the benefit of the State in
fulfilling it's duties in regulating the use of alcoholic beverages in the State.

The State of Utah heaviLy regulates the dis-

tribution and sale of alcohol.

Every ounce of

intoxicating

liquor sold in the State must at sometime pass through State
hands.

Under the Statute, the exemption of the State of Utah and

it's employees applies to their "activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in the sale or
distribution of alcoholic beverages."

In view of the States most

obvious connection to alcohol, three important words in the
Statute

are

regulating, controlling

otherwise being

involved

and

authorizing.

in the sale" language

The

"or

is an apparent

addition to cover any situation or the State as a regulator of
alcohol beverages may slip out of the exact definition of a regulation, control or authorization.

Had the Legislature intended

total exemption from liability they could have put a period after
political

subdivisions.

The excess wording
-12-

is a clue to what

they had in mind.
Neither State employment nor membership in the National
Guard

automatically

absolves any person

social responsibility.
liable

from acting

The Defendant, Alan Forsythf

without

should be

to Plaintiffs for the injury they have suffered at the

hands of Defendant Alan Forsyth
beverages

to Conrad

serving

Christensen

and

Williams Army National Guard NCO Club.

intoxicating
his guest

alcoholic

at

the

Camp

The Utah National Guard

exists for certain purposes, and the immunity granted to the
Guard only applies to the activities
purposes.
role

inherent to those certain

Most obvious purpose of the National Guard

are the

as part of the National Defense and their availability to

assist in times of disaster.

By no stretch of the imagination

does the immunized role of the National Guard extend to operations of a bar.
as a mechanic.

Defendant Forsyth's usual work for the Guard is
His work as a bartender is supplementary and out-

side his usual duties.

This further illustrates the separation

of the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO Club from legitimate
Guard activities.
The function of the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO
Club
Which

can be performed

by other than State of Utah government.

is done daily by the establishment of private

non-profit

clubs. The running of the Army National Guard NCO Club is not
essential to the core of governmental activity.
The most general test of governmental function relates to
the

nature

of

the activity.

It must be something

done or

furnished with the general public good, that is, "of a public or
-13-

governmental
public

character"

such

as

the maintenance

schools, hospitals, public

operations of

charities, public

parks, or

recreational facilities.
Section 63-30-10(1)(i), Utah Code does not set up the Utah
National Guard as an entity entirely outside the civil law of the
State as Defendant/Respondent would imply.
and

To clothe the State

it's political subdivisions i.e. the Utah National Guard in

immunity for whatever activities is to nullify the social responsibilities the State has to the citizens of the State of Utah and
it would be an utter absurdity to do otherwise.
The Lower Court's ruling should be reversed and remanded for
a hearing to determine damages.
DATED this

Zg

day of J ^ ^

* ^ 1 ^

r 1987.
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